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Abstract
By examining the intended and unintended consequences of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows and 
Cohesion Policy, this paper offers a critical assessment of the EU’s economic integration capacity in the 
Eastern European member states. We argue that although both foreign investments and EU funds have 
contributed to overall economic growth and facilitated integration to the core European and global mar-
kets, they also had divisive consequences in economic and spatial terms. First, we show that FDI, which the 
EU has actively promoted in Eastern Europe, has produced dual economies in which some privileged, FDI-
based, competitive sectors thrive along with less prosperous, domestically-owned ones. Moreover, FDI has 
also been the main driver of rising territorial disparities because the bulk of foreign investments have been 
realized in the most developed regions. Second, we demonstrate that although the funds of the Cohesion 
Policy have enhanced economic growth, they have failed to deliver on their original goal of reducing ter-
ritorial inequality. This is because – similar to FDI – EU funds tend to accumulate in the wealthiest Eastern 
regions. We argue that this is partly the consequence of the recent shift in the Cohesion Policy which has 
been captured by the economic governance agenda of the EU: instead of supporting the backward regions, 
the policy now aims to promote growth and competitiveness everywhere with less emphasis on cohesion. 
We conclude that European integration in general and FDI and Cohesion Policy in particular have produced 
externally more integrated but internally more divided economies in Eastern Europe.
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) has facilitated the economic integration of East Central Europe (ECE) primarily 
through two distinct instruments. First, an indirect tool of the EU has been the promotion of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), which, by assisting economic upgrading and structural change, was expected to contrib-
ute to growth and competitiveness in ECE. Second, the most visible instrument has been the Cohesion 
Policy, which distributes funds across the member states with the objective of enhancing territorial co-
hesion and competitiveness. In this paper, we seek to examine the effects of FDI and Cohesion Policy on 
ECE. By identifying the unintended negative consequences of both policies, we aim to provide a critical 
assessment of the EU’s economic integration capacity.
First, we argue that economic integration through FDI has reoriented ECE countries towards Western 
markets. Foreign investments have produced highly internationalized economies with a dual character: 
export-oriented, competitive, FDI-based sectors thrive side by side with sectors dominated by domestically 
owned, small and medium-sized companies. The strong presence of FDI in ECE has made these economies 
dependent on foreign investors and vulnerable to external economic shocks. At the same time, foreign 
investors rely on the cheap, high-skilled Eastern labor to boost their competitiveness. In this respect, the 
economic relationship between East and West can be characterized as asymmetrical interdependence. 
FDI has not only enhanced economic growth, but also contributed to rising regional disparities – thus, it is 
divisive both spatially and economically.
Second, with respect to the Cohesion Policy, EU funds have contributed to the Eastern members’ GDP but 
failed to deliver on their initially stated goals. On the one hand, the participation in EU-funded projects did 
not empower local and regional authorities but rather strengthened central administrations at the expense 
of subnational units. On the other hand, the more advanced ECE regions have been more successful in 
securing the funds than the backward regions. It follows that the funds did not reduce internal territorial 
disparities in ECE.
Foreign capital and EU funds therefore had mixed consequences on the economies of ECE. Overall, both FDI 
and Cohesion Policy have assisted economic growth and enhanced the integration of these countries into 
the European and global markets. However, both FDI and EU funds have produced or reproduced import-
ant spatial asymmetries, which are unintended side-effects that contradict the original policy objectives. 
For this reason, we conclude that these integrative measures of the EU have produced externally more 
integrated but internally more divided economies in ECE.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first section analyzes how the EU has promoted foreign capital 
inflows into ECE and also seeks to identify sectoral and territorial trends in FDI. The following part highlights 
the recent shifts in the Cohesion Policy and traces how these changes have affected the territorial-admin-
istrative structures of the Eastern members. In addition, it also analyzes the regional distribution of the 
funds in the previous programming period (2007-13). The final section concludes and outlines potential 
directions for further research.
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2. Integrating ECE through Foreign Direct Investment
FDI represents an external, private source of finance committed to making long-run productive investments 
in the target country. Foreign investors establish important links between the domestic and the external 
markets by which they facilitate the economic integration of the host country into the global markets. This 
is the reason why FDI has played a prominent role integrating ECE and Western Europe and has also been 
one of the main drivers of economic restructuring and upgrading in ECE. In the following pages, we discuss 
how the EU has promoted foreign investments into ECE and also highlight the main sectoral and territorial 
consequences of foreign capital penetration into these countries.
2.1 FDI as a driver of economic integration in ECE
In the early 1990s, Eastern European post-communist governments faced a dual challenge of laying the 
institutional foundations of a democratic political system and establishing market economies integrated 
into the Western European and global markets. FDI was expected to serve these goals as it was supposed 
to bring many benefits to the domestic economies such as higher economic growth, new jobs (Alguacil/
Cuadros/Orts 2008; Pickles/Smith 2005), intensified foreign trade and technological upgrading (Bradshaw 
2005), knowledge, and technological and managerial spillover to local enterprises (Rugraff 2008).
These expected benefits may paint too rosy a picture of FDI. Yet, external advisors to ECE governments 
emphasized that attracting foreign capital was an element of democratic consolidation (Pinder 1993) and 
the condition for successful economic restructuring and catch-up with the advanced capitalist countries 
(Bandelj 2008). The rise of FDI has therefore become a political issue and an indicator of commitment to 
market reforms (Bandelj 2008).
However, following the regime change, most post-communist governments adopted a rather opposing 
stance towards foreign investors. They did so because in the first decade of transition, FDI came primarily 
through privatization - thus, there was a price to pay for the inflow of external capital: the sale of the ‘family 
silver’ - mostly uncompetitive state-owned enterprises on the cheap. In addition, opening the gate wide 
open to FDI became politically risky in light of the first experiences with foreign investors who, in order to 
increase efficiency of production, often engaged in layoffs. Moreover, shielding domestic businesses from 
foreign competition was another strong argument for excluding or at least restricting the entry of foreign 
businesses into the domestic economy. With few exceptions, Eastern European governments adopted pri-
vatization schemes that either privileged insiders or restricted foreign involvement (Beblavy/Marcincin 
2000; Bohle/Greskovits 2001; Sass 2003; Vachudova 2005). 
Nevertheless, Hungary and Estonia chose a different road. Hungary opened up to FDI early on because the 
government needed instant cash revenues to finance its record-high and further deteriorating public debt 
(Bohle/Greskovits 2012; Mihályi 2001). Already before the regime change, Hungarian laws allowed foreign 
companies to develop partnership with domestic ones. This liberal FDI policy therefore finds its roots in the 
1980s (Szanyi 1998). In contrast, Estonian governments considered FDI as a key step to establishing national 
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independence because it facilitated the breakdown of state-owned enterprises especially in the industrial 
sector, which employed primarily Russian labor. As Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argue, FDI formed part of 
a nation-building project in Estonia, while in Hungary it was a tool for debt consolidation and economic 
restructuring.
2.2 Shaping FDI inflows to ECE: the EU’s role
By the mid-1990s all ECE countries had applied for EU membership, which gave the EU considerable regu-
latory influence over them: with the launch of the enlargement process, the external regulatory dimension 
of transition gained much greater salience (Bruszt 2002). This allowed for a more active promotion of for-
eign investments by the EU in Eastern Europe, which represented a key element of ‘backyard management’ 
(Jacoby 2010). Through FDI, Western European firms entered new markets and by relying on low-cost 
Eastern labor, they could also benefit from efficiency gains.
The European Commission engaged in a thorough investigation of the applicant countries’ economic, polit-
ical, and social background in order to assess the progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, which 
set the basic requirements for EU membership. The country opinions, prepared for the 1997 Luxembourg 
European Council by the Commission, demonstrate how eager the EU was to promote FDI inflows to ECE. 
In these documents, the European Commission assessed the economic situation of the applicants based 
on “the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pres-
sure and market forces within the Union”.1 The documents reveal that the EU tried to establish large-scale 
privatization of state-owned assets through FDI as a condition of membership.
Only Hungary and Estonia received positive evaluations from the Commission while it criticized every other 
Eastern candidate for their slow privatization process and low involvement of foreign investors. While the 
Estonian document suggested that “the continuation of foreign direct investment is crucial to the Estonian 
economy” (European Commission 1997: 36), the Hungarian opinion clearly revealed what the Commission 
expected from foreign capital: 
“Foreign direct investment has been playing a large role in the Hungarian restructuring process, 
at times even contributing to the development of new industries [...]. This is particularly important 
since FDI flows typically constitute an efficient way to transfer technology to the enterprise affected 
as well as to the rest of the economy through demonstration and spillover effects. FDI can also be ex-
pected to help Hungarian industry adapt to the requirements of the acquis” (European Commission 
1997: 36).
The preaching of the Commission in these documents served as guidelines for future policies. Soon, all 
the Eastern candidates complied with these demands because by the end of the 1990s, ECE governments 
1 The Copenhagen criteria are available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/crite-
ria/index_en.htm, accessed 22 July 2016.
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were replaced by coalitions that supported the speeding up of privatization and the opening to foreign 
investors. Bandelj (2010) explains this shift with the frequent interactions between EU-elites and post-com-
munist decision-makers who eventually became convinced that promoting foreign investments would be 
a desirable economic strategy. Although this aspect is certainly relevant, the take-it-or-leave-it character 
of EU accession forced the applicants to comply with EU requirements regardless of whether the domestic 
governments shared those norms or not.
As Medve-Bálint (2014, 2015b) argues, even though the EU had no legally binding tool to prescribe foreign 
involvement in the economies of the Eastern European countries, by applying quasi-legal instruments and 
exercising considerable pressure on them, it succeeded in triggering a liberal shift in investment policies 
and by the end of the 1990s, all the post-communist applicants opened up to foreign capital. In fact, the 
2000s marked an era of investment competition, during which Eastern European governments offered 
increasingly generous investment incentives to foreign investors (Drahokoupil 2008a, 2008b). 
The emerging ‘bidding war’ among ECE countries violated EU competition policy regulations. Ironically, the 
promotion of FDI in ECE generated EU intervention in defense of EU laws (for more details see Blauberger 
2009; Medve-Bálint 2014, 2015b) but the discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of the current work. 
Nevertheless, it highlights the EU’s leading role in triggering FDI-friendly policies in ECE as it created an 
enabling regulatory environment for the economic integration of ECE through FDI.
2.3 Temporal trends of FDI in ECE
While in the first decade of transition foreign capital inflows to ECE countries remained low, there has been 
a boom in FDI inflows after 2000 (Figure 1). Between 2000 and 2007, total foreign capital stock in ECE grew 
from 107 billion USD to 624 billion USD.2 Although the 2007-08 global financial and economic crises caused 
a setback in investment activity, total FDI stock climbed to 730 billion USD by 2014. This represents nearly 
three percent of the world’s total foreign investment stock.3
In spite of this impressive overall performance, the distribution of FDI across ECE is uneven. The imbalance 
is partly the consequence of the differences in the size of the domestic economies. The four countries with 
the largest nominal GDP (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) have accumulated 74 percent of 
the total FDI stock invested in Eastern Europe. Poland, the biggest economy, is by far the greatest recipient 
as well, followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania.
The differences in nominal FDI stock, however, do not reveal the differences in each country’s attractiveness 
to foreign investment. Even though Poland has secured the highest foreign capital stock in ECE, in per capita 
terms, its performance is among the poorest (Figure 2). In this respect, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Slovakia are leading, while Romania and Lithuania are the least endowed with foreign investment.
2 Calculating total FDI stock in constant dollars, the growth becomes somewhat smaller but not less impressive: 
expressed in constant 2005 USD, total FDI stock in Eastern Europe in 2007 (587 billion USD) was nearly five times 
greater than in 2000 (121 billion USD). Source: the authors’ own calculations based on UNCTAD data.
3 Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD data.
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Figure 1: Total FDI stock in ECE in millions of USD (1993-2014)
 
Source: UNCTAD.
Figure 2: Total FDI stock per capita in ECE in USD (1993-2014)
 
Source: UNCTAD.
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Taking the EU-154 as a benchmark, the per capita FDI stock in Eastern Europe falls behind the Western 
European levels. In 2014, FDI per capita in the EU-15 reached 24,931 USD whereas the Eastern European 
figure stood at 7,954 USD.5 This suggests that foreign capital inflows to Eastern Europe did not reach 
their saturation point and there remains some potential for further foreign investments into the region. 
Nevertheless, the Eastern countries match Western figures in terms of the role foreign capital plays in their 
economies. As Figure 3 shows, total FDI stock as a percentage of GDP is beyond 40 percent in all but two 
ECE countries. 
Figure 3: Total FDI stock as a percentage of GDP in ECE (1993-2014)
 
Note: EU-15 figures calculated without Luxembourg. 
Source: UNCTAD.
As Table 1 shows, the lion’s share of total FDI stock invested in ECE comes from the EU-15, which are 
responsible for more than half of total investments. In this respect, Slovenia demonstrates the highest 
share with 78 percent of total FDI stock coming from the EU-15, while Latvia has the lowest figure of 53 
percent. The data portrayed in Table 1 suggest that the primary investors in Eastern Europe are companies 
registered in the European Union. This brings further evidence for the argument that FDI has been one of 
the key channels of ECE’s economic integration with the West.  
4 Without Luxembourg, as the country enjoys a special status of a tax haven and, for this reason, is a target of extraor-
dinary FDI inflows that are neither the consequence of the size nor the performance of the domestic economy.
5 Cross-country variation in FDI per capita in Western Europe is also considerable. In this respect, the Eastern EU 
members are more homogenous because their FDI per capita varies to a smaller extent: the difference between 
the lowest (Romania: 3,453 USD in 2014) and the highest (Estonia: 15,032 USD) per capita figures is less than 
fivefold, while in the EU-15, Ireland has 43 times more per capita FDI stock than Greece. The low Greek per capita 
FDI stock is not a consequence of the deep economic crisis. Even in 2007, when FDI per capita in Greece reached 
a record high level, it stood at 4,809 USD. Data source: UNCTAD.
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Regarding the other investors, the roles of Cyprus and Luxembourg are noteworthy. These EU members 
are known for their liberal tax policies that make them particularly attractive to enterprises seeking tax 
avoidance (Gravelle 2009). For the same reason, outward FDI activity from Cyprus and Luxembourg is 
remarkably high also because this is a way of shielding the identity of the original investors. For instance, 
Cyprus is a landing place for Russian outward investments that are then further invested in European host 
countries (Pelto/Vahtra/Liuhto 2004; Tepavcevic 2014), including ECE.
In ECE, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are potentially most exposed to these types of 
investments as the share of Cypriot and Luxembourgian FDI stock is the highest there. Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Lithuania, and Poland are also the main targets for investors coming from other well-known tax havens. 
Without conducting further investigation, one may only speculate about the quality of these investments. 
They may represent a source of FDI which does not necessarily serve economic catch-up and upgrading.
Table 1: Share of selected country groups from total FDI stock (2014)
Total FDI stock 
in 2014 (millions 
of USD)
Share (%) of EU 
countries
Share (%) 
of EU-15 
countriesa
Share (%) of 
Cyprus and 
Luxembourg 
Share (%) 
of offshore 
tax havensb
Bulgaria 49 815 81.44 63.81 10.17 4.61
Czech Republic 136 001 87.39 72.29 9.76 0.17
Estonia 19 351 81.35 71.41 4.83 0.46
Croatia 31 946 91.79 65.95 6.27 1.67
Latvia 13 577 72.05 52.92 8.52 1.10
Lithuania 15 796 78.08 53.70 4.27 2.19
Hungary 102 519 76.46 60.57 14.96 0.22
Poland 235 111 87.71 72.81 13.55 1.97
Romania 77 732 88.60 77.73 6.86 0.61
Slovenia 15 469 87.05 78.18 2.96 0.86
Slovakia 55 816 90.67 69.21 8.51 0.74
a Without Luxembourg 
b FDI from Andorra, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Bermuda, Seychelles, Belize, 
Panama, the Caribbean region and Oceania
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014, UNCTAD.
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The above figures suggest that a quarter of a century after the collapse of communism, ECE economies are 
as much internationalized as the Western European ones.6 However, the rapid internationalization of these 
markets raises concerns about the sustainability of the ECE model. Foreign capital plays such a dominant 
role in ECE that some authors consider them as dependent market economies (Nölke/Vliegenthart 2009) or 
FDI-based market economies (Myant/Drahokoupil 2011). Given the speed of transformation during which 
foreign investors have taken a leading role in ECE, Šćepanović (2013) refers to their pathways as a hyper-in-
tegrationist development model, in which foreign capital inflows inhibit the growth of domestic economic 
capabilities. 
Being dependent on foreign capital increases the risk of exposure to external economic shocks. Indeed, 
the global financial and economic crisis took a heavy toll on the Eastern European countries but recov-
ery from the economic downturn was relatively fast and FDI seemed to facilitate rather than hinder this 
process (Myant/Drahokoupil 2012; Smith/Swain 2010). Foreign investments therefore represent a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, they contribute to the integration of the Eastern economies to global markets: 
they develop competitive, export-oriented productive or service sectors and upgrade those to interna-
tional standards; and generate economic growth. On the other hand, excessive reliance on foreign capital 
increases the domestic economy’s vulnerability to external economic shocks and FDI may also hinder the 
development of domestically-owned sectors (crowding-out effect). 
Another controversial factor related to FDI inflows is the race-to-the bottom effect which follows from the 
competition for investments. This is manifested in the gradual decrease in corporate income taxes, the deteri-
oration of industrial relations, and welfare state retrenchment (Bohle 2009). These effects are also conditional 
on the sectoral composition of FDI (Bohle/Greskovits 2006). Thus, they may vary in degree but are present 
to a certain extent in each ECE economy. The next section thus examines the sectoral aspects of FDI in ECE.
2.4 The sectoral distribution of FDI in ECE
The share of foreign-owned companies from the total production value of specific economic sectors is a 
suitable indicator for estimating the role of foreign investors in the different segments of the ECE econo-
mies. This measure shows the percentage of the total production value which is produced by foreign-owned 
companies. Table 2 shows the latest of these figures for the Eastern European EU members.7 It reveals that 
foreign-owned production is the most significant in Hungary and Slovakia, where, respectively, 57 and 
60 percent of the total production value of the economy is produced by foreign companies. In the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, and Romania, foreign-owned companies are responsible for nearly half of the total pro-
duction value. These figures give further support for the claim that ECE economies are strongly dependent 
on foreign capital and foreign-owned production.
6 Slovenia is a notable exception to this rule. The country has remained the least open to FDI and it did so inten-
tionally. The Slovene neo-corporatist model – unique in the region – is based on a tripartite coordination among 
the state, labor, and employers which requires a delicate balancing of interests (Bohle/Greskovits 2012). Foreign 
investments in strategic domestic sectors, which were already competitive in the Western market, would have 
ruined this balance and it was not in the interest of either labor or company managers to let foreigners take a 
greater share in the domestic economy (for more on this, see Crowley/Stanojević 2011).
7 The financial and insurance sectors are not included in the calculations.
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In spite of the overall dependence on FDI, the sectoral level of internationalization varies across ECE. In this 
respect, the manufacturing, wholesale and info-communication sectors are the most dominated by foreign 
investors, while construction, transportation, accommodation, and food services are the least penetrated 
by them. This is consistent with earlier findings about the preferred sectoral targets of FDI (Bandelj 2008; 
Bohle/Greskovits 2012; Drahokoupil 2008a). The Baltic states attracted investments mainly into services 
and the financial sector, while the others have excelled in securing manufacturing investments. 
Table 2: Share (%) of foreign-owned affiliates from total production value by economic sectors (2012)
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Bulgaria 39.07 53.83 14.36 28.36 20.35 18.07 51.39
Czech Republic 47.50 66.44 17.51 38.52 28.80 20.48 62.28
Estonia 47.59 59.72 20.83 45.74 31.90 33.89 75.67
Croatia 27.42 27.64 10.15 27.57 n.a 15.43 57.39
Latvia 26.68 31.58 9.50 43.23 16.02 30.58 38.84
Lithuania 39.29 57.89 13.94 28.94 15.47 13.47 58.48
Hungary 57.50 69.26 18.89 48.97 30.50 26.03 71.48
Poland 37.69 46.11 23.69 41.71 20.33 23.39 57.42
Romania 47.00 62.03 19.79 40.89 20.33 15.91 68.36
Slovenia 23.48 32.55 6.87 29.38 14.91 8.77 29.75
Slovakia 60.04 81.91 24.27 28.23 27.80 10.09 58.45
a Without financial and insurance activities
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT FATS database.
A closer look at the manufacturing sector (Table 3) reveals that foreign businesses have captured nearly ev-
ery sub-segment and in some cases the presence of domestic enterprises is negligible. The computer, elec-
tronic, and optical products industry8 and especially the automotive industry are the ones where foreign 
firms have conquered the entire market. These sectors are also the most competitive and export-oriented. 
Yet, their high level of internationalization also suffers from certain important drawbacks.
8  With the exception of Lithuania and Slovenia.
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Table 3: Share (%) of foreign-owned affiliates from total production value in the manufacturing sector (2012)
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Bulgaria 34.15 40.59 30.38 52.53 49.97 88.35
Czech Republic 38.99 35.32 54.64 63.23 82.97 94.93
Estonia 50.60 64.44 35.48 66.76 93.62 78.88
Croatia 22.23 62.68 13.28 27.17 49.89 78.44
Latvia 27.67 61.95 28.93 11.80 85.18 n.a
Lithuania 25.18 39.91 50.34 59.08 30.16 82.18
Hungary 49.11 64.93 58.27 58.55 95.30 96.33
Poland 39.30 31.73 64.36 31.58 74.88 89.67
Romania 41.70 53.84 61.97 50.95 76.75 95.43
Slovenia 10.81 50.41 27.89 41.58 32.32 59.31
Slovakia 50.30 68.55 50.77 67.31 92.65 99.39
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on EUROSTAT FATS database.
As Pavlínek (2015) argues, the Eastern European FDI-based automotive industry is an example of an ‘in-
tegrated peripheral market’ in which production takes place mostly in routine assembly operations that 
represent the low-value added segment of the value chain with weak or nonexistent R&D functions. 
Furthermore, domestic businesses benefit from spillovers only to a limited extent and remain subordinate 
to foreign partners. The same applies to service investments where the main attraction of the region lies in 
its cheap, relatively high-skilled workforce (Capik and Drahokoupil 2011; Gál 2014; Sass 2011).
Dependence on FDI is not as one-sided as the above observations would suggest. This is because for-
eign companies have relied on investments into ECE to increase their competitiveness on global markets. 
Econometric evidence also suggests that ECE serves as an extended market for Western Europe and the 
level of economic interconnectedness between the two sides of the continent is high (Prettner/Prettner 
2014). Taking this into account, the relationship between the Eastern members and the EU-15 can rather 
be characterized as asymmetrical economic interdependence.
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2.5 The territorial aspects of FDI in ECE
Having introduced FDI trends in ECE as well as the sectoral aspects, the territorial dimension of foreign in-
vestment also needs to be discussed, especially given that the spatial distribution of FDI in ECE corresponds 
to the predictions of mainstream economic theories. Location theories (Hirschman 1958; Myrdal 1957), 
endogenous growth theory (Lucas 1988; Romer 1986), and new economic geography (Krugman 1991) 
contend that economic activity will concentrate in central places because of the so-called agglomeration 
effects. This leads to uneven spatial distribution of capital, labor, knowledge, and technology. 
The uneven distribution of FDI in ECE clearly follows this pattern in that only a handful of regions have 
become the targets of foreign investors. While foreign investments have contributed to the economic 
catch-up and integration of these economies into the global markets, in spatial terms this process has been 
highly selective. The metropolitan regions and those that already had a relatively strong and diverse indus-
trial base were able to secure most of the foreign capital inflows. As several scholars have shown, this is 
a uniform trend across ECE (Brown/Greskovits/Kulcsár 2007; Chidlow/Salciuviene/Young 2009; Dornean/
Oanea 2015; Hunya 2014; Smętkowski 2013).
The uneven territorial distribution of foreign investment has also contributed to growing regional disparities 
because FDI has primarily entered the prosperous, leading regions which have become well-integrated into 
global markets. Conversely, those areas that have not succeeded in attracting considerable FDI remained 
backward. To put it differently, there is a strong association between the regional level of development and 
FDI: those regions that are more developed also tend to secure more foreign investments.
Figure 4 depicts this relationship for the NUTS 3 regions9 of four Eastern European countries, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, which have been among the leading recipients of FDI and for 
which comparable data on regional foreign capital stock is available. The chart shows that the four capital 
city regions, which are also the most developed, have accumulated the highest per capita stock of FDI. The 
correlation coefficient between the two indicators is high and significant (r = 0.699, N = 108, p < 0.001), 
which reinforces the claim that regions with greater foreign capital endowment indeed demonstrate higher 
levels of development. This also suggests that regions with substantial levels of foreign capital inflows have 
served as the growth poles of the Eastern EU members: the incremental convergence of country-level per 
capita GDP between East and West is thus largely driven by the outstanding growth performance of those 
few prosperous Eastern city regions that have attracted the bulk of FDI. 
While in the last two decades predominantly rural and intermediate regions tended to exceed the growth 
of city regions in the EU-15, the opposite has been the case in ECE (Dijkstra/Garcilazo/McCann 2013). FDI 
has been a key factor in this process: metropolitan regions in the East not only receive more foreign invest-
ments, but also attract more diverse industries and especially higher-end services which embed them in 
 
9 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) is the standardized territorial administrative system used in 
the EU. The NUTS 3 level refers to the county level administrative units.
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international trade networks and, as a consequence, these regions experience higher growth rates than 
those with less or less diversified foreign capital (Dogaru et al. 2015). 
This is not unique to ECE though: as Giannetti (2002) has shown, country-level convergence within the EU 
is driven by those regions which specialize in high-tech sectors, whereas those regions that do not upgrade 
their economies are lagging behind. In this sense, a simultaneous process of convergence and divergence 
shapes European economies. What is peculiar about ECE is that the location patterns of FDI drive this 
phenomenon.
Figure 4: The association between regional FDI stock per capita and GDP per capita in four Eastern 
European EU members (2012)
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on data obtained from the national central banks and Eurostat.
Although after the economic and financial crisis of 2007-08 foreign capital inflows to Eastern Europe have 
dried up and are yet to recover, the territorial distribution of FDI has remained the same. Before the crisis, 
investments into complex manufacturing dominated, but since then a shift towards services has taken 
place. In spite of this change in the sectoral orientation of FDI, the same preferred regions continue to 
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receive most of the investments – metropolitan and city regions have managed to retain their privileged 
status (Medve-Bálint 2015a). Moreover, as Capello and Perucca (2015) demonstrate, the regions with a 
high presence of foreign investors may be more capable of adjusting to economic crises and experiencing 
a quick recovery. This also implies that the long-term economic prospects of the Eastern European regions 
crucially depend on their ability to attract FDI. 
All things considered, it seems that two types of asymmetries characterize the integration of Eastern Europe 
into the EU and global markets. First, these countries and their economic performance have become de-
pendent on FDI, although the competitiveness of EU-15 investors also benefited from the low-wage, high-
skilled Eastern European workforce and the geographical proximity of these states to the core EU markets. 
Second, integration through FDI at the subnational level is asymmetrical: few leading regions secure the 
majority of foreign investments with which they establish a leading position relative to those areas that are 
unable to catch the attention of investors. This leads to sustained and growing regional disparities in the 
East, which highlights the significance of countervailing measures and regulatory interventions, such as the 
role of the most important direct integrative instrument of the EU, the Cohesion Policy.
3. Integration of ECE through the Cohesion Policy
The previous section has shown that the integration of ECE through FDI has produced two distinct asym-
metries: first, ECE countries have become dependent on foreign capital inflows, while investors depend 
on the cheap and high-skilled Eastern European labor. Second, FDI has accumulated in the relatively 
well-developed regions. Thereby, it contributed to their superior growth performance and increased the 
developmental gaps between advanced and backward regions within the host countries. Growing regional 
disparities have thus gained political salience in ECE and in this context, the Cohesion Policy, whose central 
beneficiaries are the ECE countries,10 lends itself for further analysis.
3.1 The objectives of the Cohesion Policy: an overview
The Cohesion Policy is the most important direct integrative instrument of the European Union represent-
ing one third of the total budget. It has multiple goals, such as fostering development, good economic 
governance, competitiveness, and local democracy, as well as strengthening the identity and visibility of 
the EU at the local level. Nevertheless, its most important aim is to narrow the national and regional devel-
opment gaps across the member states. Because of its regional orientation, the policy was also expected to 
strengthen subnational administrations against the central state.
Currently, the EU’s Cohesion Policy “is one of, if not the, largest integrated development policy in the 
Western world, and one of the largest of such programmes anywhere in the world” (McCann/Varga 
10 In the 2014-20 programming period, the eleven Eastern member states, which in 2015 represented 20.3 percent 
of the EU’s population, receive 50.4 percent of the total budget of the Cohesion Policy. Source: the authors’ own 
calculations based on Eurostat data (population) and European Structural and Investment Funds Open Data Plat-
form, available at https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/, accessed 3 December 2015.
                 More Integrated but Also More Divided | 19
2015:1255). The history of the policy goes back to the Treaty of Rome (1957), which laid down the main 
objectives of a European development policy. According to these founding principles, the policy should 
address economic, social, and territorial cohesion across the member states:
“In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its 
actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, 
the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.” (Article 174 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union)
The Treaty thus implies a territorially focused policy which is based on the principle of solidarity, meaning 
that financial resources from the more developed countries and regions are redistributed to the backward 
areas. While the Cohesion Policy seems to bear a strong normative element, it is also motivated by eco-
nomic rationale. This is because market economies produce territorial imbalances if the flow of capital and 
labor is free. 
In the first section on FDI, we already introduced the concept of agglomeration effects which implies that 
factors of production as well as innovation and know-how tend to concentrate at some privileged locations 
which will experience higher growth rates than other places (see for instance Krugman 1991; Lucas 1988; 
Myrdal 1957; Romer 1986). If the direction of flows remains persistent, then it leads to the spatial polar-
ization of the economy. The creation of the European single market through the elimination of all barriers 
to the free flow of goods, labor, capital, and services released those spatially divisive forces which had 
been previously contained within national borders. European integration was expected to widen the gap 
between the most developed and less prosperous countries and regions. 
In order to prevent divergence between core and periphery and to compensate for the negative territorial 
effects of integration, the Cohesion Policy became a key tool for the EU to address spatial imbalances. 
Funds targeting the most backward regions were expected to enhance their economic growth and assist 
them in catching up with the core areas (Allen 2010; Frisina 2008). Also, a Europe-wide development policy 
was an attempt to “match the territorial scale of the response with the source of the economic problems” 
(Begg 2010: 81). The Cohesion Policy has thus become an instrument to counterbalance the widening gap 
between the rich and the poor European regions.
However, it has not evolved in isolation from broader socio-economic goals that the EU has pursued. We ar-
gue that this has undermined some of the key initial objectives of the Cohesion Policy. First, the recent EU-
wide emphasis on growth and competitiveness rather than redistribution and cohesion has downplayed 
the goals of territorial convergence and development. Second, the EU’s ‘competitive solidarity’ approach 
has also undermined the decentralization agenda and failed to empower the local level vis-à-vis the nation 
state. In the following pages, we show how these processes have taken place in ECE. 
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3.2 Cohesion Policy and subnational authority in ECE
In 1988, the reform of the Cohesion Policy introduced the partnership principle which stipulated that the 
European Commission and national and regional authorities had to coordinate the planning and imple-
mentation of the programs. The partnership principle provided the opportunity for subnational govern-
ments to actively participate in the design and implementation of the policy (Thielemann 2002). In this 
vein, the 1988 reforms were also “bound to affect territorial relations in the member states by empowering 
subnational authorities” (Hooghe 1996: 6).
In the 1990s and early 2000s, several scholars addressed the question as to whether the reformed Cohesion 
Policy would indeed weaken the national governments and bring about the rise of local and regional au-
tonomy. From a multilevel governance perspective, it seemed that over time subnational actors would be 
able to challenge central governments and replace them as ‘gatekeepers’ in European affairs (Bache 1998). 
Others considered the Cohesion Policy as a signal for the emergence of a networked polity in which the 
distinction between state and non-state actors and the hierarchy among different levels of government 
would become blurred (Ansell 2000).
As the Western European examples showed, this ‘regional turn’ was far less notable and much more am-
biguous than expected. Although institutional adjustment necessary for accessing the funds took place in 
every member state (Benz/Eberlein 1999), the subnational level gained strength only in those countries 
where regional institutional capacities were already strong for a meaningful participation in the policy 
(Bailey/Propris 2002b). Domestic institutional capabilities thus became the key determinants of the de-
gree of regionalization and in this respect, the outcome varied considerably across the member states 
(Börzel 2002). The 1988 reform of the Cohesion Policy has therefore led to diversified Europeanization 
of regional policies and state administrations in Western Europe, conditional on domestic institutional 
settings (Baudner/Bull 2013).
In the case of Eastern Europe, the EU had greater leverage over domestic outcomes because of the 
conditionality of enlargement. However, a uniformly binding rule on how territorial administration should be 
organized did not exist: the acquis was ‘thin’ on the institutional requirements for the implementation of the 
regional policy (Hughes/Sasse/Gordon 2004) and there is no EU law on regionalization either. Although the 
European Commission was pushing for decentralization in the candidate countries, it had to acknowledge 
that “the decentralisation of responsibilities necessary for an effective regional policy is likely to be a lengthy 
process and the countries need to continue their efforts to establish the structures and procedures necessary 
for them to receive support from the EU Structural Funds” (European Commission 1999: 193). 
Drawing on Western examples, some scholars warned that “regional institutional structures are unlikely 
to be sufficiently developed to enable the weakest regions to be active partners” in Eastern Europe 
(Bailey/Propris 2002b: 424). The same authors also pointed out that the creation of adequate regional 
institutional capabilities would require time but this process had not been facilitated by pre-accession 
funds, which mostly focused on the national level thereby strengthening central administrations and 
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having little impact on the subnational level (Bailey/Propris 2002a). Yet, Bruszt and Vedres (2013) have 
provided convincing counter-evidence: by examining a sample of Eastern European regions, they found that 
deeper and more lasting experience with EU pre-accession assistance was associated with stronger post-
accession developmental agency. Pre-accession capacity building at the regional level has – to a certain 
extent – produced the intended outcome and resulted in the external empowerment of local agents.
While initially the Commission insisted on territorial reforms, it shifted its agenda as the accession 
negotiations progressed. Instead of regionalization, the Commission began to place greater emphasis on 
the efficient use of funds, which required greater administrative capacity to spend the allocated budget. 
This eventually involved centralized fund management (Ferry/McMaster 2013; Grabbe 2001).
Why did the EC change its original approach? First, the Prodi Commission, which took office in 1999, 
shared the view that the weak administrative capacity of regional actors in Eastern Europe would seriously 
compromise the ability of these countries to effectively manage EU funds (Bailey/De Propris 2004). Second, 
the adoption of the Lisbon strategy in 2000 set new mid-term strategic goals for the EU, which also affected 
the Cohesion Policy. According to the Lisbon agenda, by 2010 the EU should have become “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Parliament 2000). The strategy prescribed 
that EU funds should promote economic growth - thus, they needed to be spent efficiently. This is why 
efficient fund management became a key concern for the Commission. It “wanted centralized management 
of funds so as to maximize efficiency, streamlining and control of expenditures” (Hughes et al. 2004: 541). 
The shift in the Commission’s approach reinforced the centralized decision-making systems in the Eastern 
member states, thus empowering central governments instead of regional administrations. The ECE 
countries therefore adopted centralized institutional arrangements which allowed for only a limited role 
of regions and localities in the design and implementation of the programs. The dominance of central 
administrations left local actors in a position of “learned helplessness” (Bruszt 2008). This legacy dates 
back to the communist times, which puts an ironic tone to the integration of Eastern member states into 
the multilevel governance system of the EU.
3.3 The ‘Lisbonization’ of the Cohesion Policy
The adoption of the Lisbon Agenda paved the way for the second shift in the Cohesion Policy because 
the EU began to promote growth and development in all territories (Bachtler/Wishlade 2011). This was 
consistent with the so-called place-based approach to regional development: instead of targeting the 
struggling regions, place-based policies aim at stimulating growth everywhere relying on endogenous 
growth potentials (Barca 2009; Ferry/McMaster 2013).
The economic crisis that pulled Europe into a deep recession in 2008 reinforced the above shift in the 
primary objectives. As the economic output of the member states went into freefall, EU funds served as a 
buffering against the crisis: the EU accelerated spending by relaxing some of the payment rules and granting 
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access to advanced payments. In this way, the funds represented a significant financial compensation for 
declining public consumption in the member states, particularly in ECE (Jacoby 2014). The crisis set the 
context for the negotiations about the next budget period (2014-20) and in these circumstances, the net 
contributors to the EU budget expressed concerns about the use of the funds. 
While the UK insisted on reducing the budget for the Cohesion Policy, Germany argued for stricter spending 
rules and proposed the introduction of institutional conditionalities. At the same time, net beneficiary 
countries – mostly the Eastern European member states – and the Commission expressed a different view 
as they referred to the principle of solidarity and argued against the budget cuts. In essence, the fault lines 
emerged between net payers and net recipients (Bachtler/Mendez/Wishlade 2013). The former wanted 
to align the Cohesion Policy more with the economic governance agenda, which prescribes a stricter 
mechanism of EU-wide fiscal surveillance and demands greater fiscal discipline from the member states. 
The latter were especially concerned about keeping the national allocations at a similar level compared to 
the 2007-13 period.
Recent findings in the literature about the effects of EU funds supplied the net contributor countries with 
further arguments. Several authors have found that the domestic institutional environment limits the 
absorption capacity of a country or a region. To put it differently, EU funds may contribute to economic 
growth only in those areas that demonstrate a sufficiently high level of institutional capacity (Ederveen/de 
Groot/Nahuis 2006). This relationship has been demonstrated by other authors as well (see for instance 
Milio 2007) and generated a scholarly debate about whether institutional quality may be a conditioning 
factor for regional development (Rodríguez-Pose 2013). 
In the context of the Cohesion Policy, a recent study (Rodríguez-Pose/Garcilazo 2015) confirmed that the 
quality of local and regional institutions is a key mediating factor for the growth-generating potential of the 
funds. The authors concluded that “in many of the regions receiving the bulk of Structural Funds, greater 
levels of cohesion expenditure would, in the best-case scenario, only lead to a marginal improvement 
in economic growth, unless the quality of the government is significantly improved” (Rodríguez-Pose/
Garcilazo 2015: 1288). The scholarly literature reinforces the net payers’ view about stricter controls 
over spending and the introduction of institutional conditionalities. At the same time, the emphasis on 
promoting growth also implies a turn away from supporting the most backward areas, which, ironically 
enough, often demonstrate inferior institutional quality.
During the negotiations about the budget and the new rules of Cohesion Policy for the 2014-20 
programming period, each member state agreed that there was a need to respond to the economic crisis, 
but net contributors and net recipients differed to a great extent about how this should take place. The 
turning point came when Poland, the greatest net recipient that takes 20 percent of the total 2014-20 
budget, aligned with the net contributors.
According to a high-level diplomat who represented Poland at the negotiations, the primary goal of the 
Polish government was to save the policy. They also had to manage domestic expectations about the size 
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of the budget the country could get.11 In this vein, Poland became a supporter of the proposed institutional 
conditionalities. Thereby, the most important net recipient made a strong and credible commitment to 
the reforms. This severely weakened the opposition of the other net recipients. In the end, the demands 
of the net payers were satisfied but, as compensation for the proposed measures, the total budget of the 
policy was cut only by five percent (in real terms) compared to the 2007-13 programming period.
As a consequence, since 2014 the Cohesion Policy has been closely aligned with the EU’s economic 
governance agenda: fiscal discipline, efficient spending, and the stimulation of growth became the 
primary objectives. The new institutional criteria for the payments include three main dimensions. First, 
the so-called ex-ante conditionalities contain both thematic (related to a sector or policy that receives 
support) and general (public procurement or anti-discrimination requirements) conditions which need 
to be fulfilled by the end of 2016; otherwise the Commission will automatically suspend the payments. 
Second, the regulations have set ex-post conditionalities as well, which refer to performance targets that 
the funds should achieve. Third, there are country-specific macro-economic conditionalities regarding the 
member states’ fiscal and economic policies, which make funding dependent on how closely they respect 
the economic governance rules (European Commission 2014). 
All things considered, the institutional dimension and the objective of growth have made the territorial 
aspect and the principle of solidarity a secondary goal of the Cohesion Policy. In their analysis of the recent 
regulatory changes introduced for the 2014-20 programming period, Avdikos and Chardas (2016) argue that 
the reorientation of the policy’s focus from cohesion to regional growth and competitiveness is likely to 
exacerbate existing regional disparities in economic performance and would augment territorial inequality. 
The authors refer to the ‘Lisbonization’ of the Cohesion Policy, by which it has been gradually tied to the 
economic governance agenda that has cemented the logic of austerity in the EU (Avdikos/Chardas 2016: 109).
In the ECE context, the requirement to spend the funds efficiently supplies central governments with 
a powerful argument against delegating administrative powers to the regional authorities. This is also 
manifested in the structure of the national operational programs for the 2014-20 programming period. 
Compared to 2007-13, only Poland has retained regional operational programs (ROP), while besides the 
sectoral programs, every other Eastern member state adopted a single, integrated regional operational 
program with centralized fund management. The change is most notable in the case of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovakia, which completed separate ROPs for each NUTS 2 region in the previous period, but 
they have been replaced by a single ROP in the current programming cycle. In practice, this implies further 
centralization of fund management and even less involvement of the regional level into the decision-
making system.
It remains to be seen though whether the stricter institutional conditionalities will be fulfilled or not and 
whether they will indeed serve the goal of economic growth. A recent study has found that conditionalities 
introduced in the former funding periods, such as the decommitment rule, the performance reserve, and 
11 Oral communication at a roundtable discussion on EU Cohesion Policy regulations (Brussels University Club, 14 
October 2015).
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the earmarking rules,12 did not lead to more effective spending (Bachtler/Ferry 2015). In some instances, 
they rather increased the speed of committing the funds but adversely affected the quality of projects. 
These findings question the utility of the conditionalities and make it somewhat doubtful that an improved 
institutional environment would indeed result in more efficient spending.
Figure 5: Share of the total national allocation of the Cohesion Policy funds (2007-13) still to be executed 
at the end of 2014 and average quality of government (2004-13)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Worldwide Governance Indicators and European Commission 2015: 30. 
Indeed, as Figure 5 suggests, beyond a certain level, the quality of government in ECE is not related to 
performance in spending the funds. The figure shows the share of the total 2007-13 national allocation 
that was not paid (still to be executed) at the end of 2014 and the average value of a composite indicator 
of institutional quality13 in 2004-13. Data on the uncommitted funds also reflect the absorption capacity of 
the Eastern member states or, in other words, their spending ability. In principle, a higher share of unspent 
national allocation suggests lower efficiency in spending.
The chart shows that Bulgaria and Romania, the worst performers in terms of institutional quality, were 
among those Eastern countries that proved the slowest in spending the funds. This is also related to 
12 The decommitment rule is also known as the n+2 rule, which was first introduced for the 2000-06 funding period. 
It stipulated that any funding awarded to a project had to be paid out within two years, otherwise the Commission 
would automatically decommit it. The performance reserve was also introduced in the 2000-06 programming cy-
cle. It specified that four percent of the national allocations had to be kept back to subsequently reward the most 
successful programs within each member state. The earmarking rules were first applied in 2007-13. These rules 
prescribed that a certain proportion of the total expenditures had to be allocated to specific investment categories 
such as innovation, the knowledge economy, information and communication technology etc.
13 The quality of government index is the arithmetic mean of the Worldwide Governance Indicators of regulatory 
quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption (2004-13). Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home, accessed 26 July 2016.
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the fact that in 2008, the European Commission decided to temporarily suspend the payments to these 
two countries because of the reportedly corrupted fund management (Spendzharova/Vachudova 2012). 
Nevertheless, the other ECE countries demonstrate huge variation in absorption capacity which does 
not correspond to their institutional quality. For instance, Lithuania and Slovakia are rather similar in 
this dimension but their spending rates are radically different: while Lithuania was the most efficient in 
committing the funds, Slovakia remained just slightly ahead of the weakest performer, Romania. 
Table 4: Cumulative national contributions to the EU budget and total payments to the Eastern member 
states from the Cohesion Policy since EU accession until 2014
Total 
payments to 
the member 
states (mn of 
EUR)
Total national 
contribution to 
the EU budget 
(mn of EUR)
Difference in 
total payments 
and total 
contributions 
(total net 
payments) in 
mn of EUR
Total per 
capita net 
payment in 
EUR
Total net 
payment in 
percentage 
(%) of total 
GDP
Bulgaria 4941 2698 2243 300 .72
Czech Republic 19811 12539 7271 701 .46
Estonia 4051 1422 2629 1965 1.55
Latvia 5074 1869 3206 1495 1.49
Lithuania 8801 2701 6100 1928 1.93
Hungary 23308 8631 14677 1466 1.37
Poland 70450 31203 39247 1030 1.07
Romania 11373 9372 2000 97 .19
Slovenia 4232 3278 954 470 .25
Slovakia 9208 5503 3705 688 .56
Note: In the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, the data refers to 2007-13, while for the other countries the time 
period is 2004-14. Croatia is not included because the country became an EU member in 2013, thus, only two years 
of budget data are available. Population data was calculated as the annual average population in the above time 
periods.
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Eurostat (population and GDP) and EU budget data
In the context of the economic and financial crisis, the contribution of the EU funds to the national GDP 
of the ECE countries became a salient issue. As Table 4 shows, in both per capita terms and in terms 
of contribution to the GDP, the Baltic states and Hungary have been the greatest beneficiaries of the 
Cohesion Policy. In their case, the net balance of funds and national payments to the EU budget ranges 
from 1.37 to 1.95 percent of the GDP. This is notable by any measure. The per capita net payments in the 
case of these four countries are also outstanding compared to the other Eastern members. As for the low 
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performers, it is particularly striking that in per capita terms Bulgaria and Romania, the two poorest EU 
members, benefited the least from the funds. 
These figures also reveal an almost irresolvable problem of the Cohesion Policy: the most backward 
member states are the least able to efficiently spend their national allocations, but they are in the greatest 
need for external financial resources for development. However, increasing their share in the Cohesion 
Policy budget (i.e. distributing more funds to them) may not generate further economic growth because of 
their inferior capacity to spend the funds. But, as discussed earlier, enhancing the quality of the domestic 
institutions may not deliver immediate results either.
In spite of these concerns, the positive balance of national contributions and payments suggest that, 
overall, each Eastern European member state has benefited from the funds. As an external source of 
income, Cohesion Policy has ‘topped up’ national GDP, which, especially during the years of the crisis, 
served as a buffer against deeper economic decline (Jacoby 2014). We thus do not question the overall 
contribution of the funds to economic growth in ECE and do not doubt the argument put forward by 
several scholars that EU membership has a substantial positive effect on per capita GDP (Campos/Coricelli/
Moretti 2014). However, similar to Avdikos and Chardas (2016), we argue that the shifts in the regulatory 
framework of the Cohesion Policy may not serve the needs of the most backward Eastern regions. In 
other words, instead of lowering the internal developmental gaps, the funds may have maintained or even 
widened existing territorial disparities. In the next section, we demonstrate this empirically.
3.4 Territorial disparities and EU funds in ECE
An investigation into the regional distribution of the 2007-13 EU funds in the Eastern member states 
provides evidence for the claim that the Cohesion Policy does not facilitate the catch-up of the poorest 
regions. In fact, the funds seem to reinforce existing territorial disparities both within and across ECE 
countries. Figure 6 shows the total EU funds per capita spent in the NUTS 3 regions of the Eastern member 
states until 2014 and their mean GDP per capita in 2007-11.14 In order to produce a visually more appealing 
chart and also to reduce the positive skew in the data, the original values were logarithmically transformed.
The chart reveals a positive relationship between per capita funds and GDP, which is confirmed by the 
positive and significant correlation coefficient of the two indicators (0.467, p < 0.001 N = 211). This 
suggests that more prosperous Eastern regions are likely to secure more EU funds per capita. On the one 
hand, this is related to the fact that the per capita national allocations for the two poorest countries with 
the poorest regions, Bulgaria and Romania, was below every other Eastern member state. Consequently, 
Bulgarian and Romanian NUTS 3 regions, on average, received the lowest EU support in the previous 
funding period. In this respect, the positive correlation between GDP and EU funds is partly driven by 
these two county cases. On the other hand, the distribution of the funds across the regions shows another 
particular feature: some of the relatively most prosperous areas have become the greatest beneficiaries of 
the Cohesion Policy while the least advanced ones are lagging behind.
14 In the Eurostat database, regional GDP figures for the NUTS 3 units are available only until 2011.
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Figure 6: Regional GDP per capita and total EU funds per capita (2007-13 programming period) in the 
NUTS 3 regions of the Eastern EU member states
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU fund data provided by DG Urban and Regional Policy and 
Eurostat data.
A potential weakness of the data portrayed in Figure 6 is that it only accounts for expenditures from the 
European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund and does not include spending from the 
European Social Fund. However, a recent analysis (Medve-Bálint 2015b) of the territorial distribution of 
the EU funds in four ECE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), which accounted for 
the expenditures from each of these funding sources, has reached similar conclusions.
We have run a regression analysis to further establish the relationship between funds and regional GDP per 
capita and also to control for other potential economic factors that may play a role in fund distribution. The 
availability of comparable cross-regional data seriously limited the scope of those variables that we could 
include in the models. In addition to the main explanatory variable, GDP per capita, we considered the 
following indicators for testing our assumption: regional population, population density, and employment 
level.15
15 Please consult the Appendix for the full description and operationalization of the variables.
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We expect that as the regional number of inhabitants grows, the per capita amount of secured EU funds 
decreases simply because the region needs to absorb proportionally more financial support from a limited 
pool of resources to match the performance of lowly inhabited areas. There is a conditioning factor 
though: per capita funds may be positively associated with population density because, presumably, the 
metropolitan areas and city-regions, which demonstrate a high density of population, are able to attract 
more funds due to their superior capacity to generate own resources and the abundance of actors that are 
eligible for submitting project applications. Regarding employment, funds should target those areas that 
face challenges of unemployment, thus we expect that the higher the regional level of employment, the 
lower per capita funds the region receives. With our data, we may not capture this relationship because 
expenditures from the European Social Fund, which is the primary instrument to finance employment and 
human capital projects, are unavailable at the regional level. 
We ran OLS regressions on the dataset of the 211 Eastern European NUTS 3 regions.16 In each model, we 
included country dummies in order to control for the unobserved variables that produce cross-country 
variation in the dependent variable. The indicators of GDP per capita, population size, and population density 
were logarithmically transformed in order to normalize their distribution. The results are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5: Results of the OLS estimations. Dependent variable: total contracted EU funds per capita (2007-13) 
in the Eastern European NUTS 3 regions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Constant 3.255*** 0.867 4.360*** 1.266 3.820*** 1.452 6.962*** 0.884
GDP per capita 0.347*** 0.096 0.464*** 0.149 0.402** 0.180
Not convergence 
region
-0.548*** 0.165 -0.514*** 0.150 -0.673*** 0.203 -0.925*** 0.247
Business density 0.006** 0.002
Population -0.177** 0.066 -0.110 0.076 -0.118 0.083
Population density 0.006 0.054 -0.036 0.058 0.005 0.052
Employment level 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005
Country fixed 
effects
yes yes yes yes
N 211 211 186 170
F-value 55.83*** 53.21*** 55.34*** 57.97***
Root MSE .404 .400 .403 .413
R-squared .72 .73 .75 .74
Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors 
*** p < .01 ** p < .05
16 A multilevel linear model may better fit the data but given the low number of cases in the grouping variable (coun-
tries in which regions are nested), the application of this method would be statistically problematic.
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In Model 1, we included only two explanatory variables besides the country dummies. The first one is 
regional GDP per capita, the second one is a dummy indicating whether the region was a convergence 
region or not in the 2007-13 programming cycle. Because convergence regions were eligible for the highest 
level of support, we expected that in those few that did not qualify for this category the per capita amount 
of contracted EU funds would be lower. The first model confirms our expectations because both explanatory 
factors show the expected relationship with the dependent variable and are significant as well.
In Model 2, we included the indicators of population and population density. These changes did not affect 
the sign and the significance of the GDP variable and the funding category dummy. While both population 
and population density demonstrate the expected sign, only population size is significant. In Model 3, 
we introduced the indicator of regional employment level. The reason why we treated it separately is 
that for some Polish regions and for all the Slovenian ones, employment data is unavailable. Thus, the 
number of cases in which the model is estimated is lower than in the first two instances. Even by adding 
employment to the regression, GDP per capita remains significant and shows a positive association with 
EU funds per capita. This simple modeling exercise has therefore confirmed that, on average, the richer 
Eastern European regions were able to secure more per capita funds than the backward ones.
As a robustness check for the results, in Model 4 we replaced the GDP indicator with an indicator of 
regional business density, which was calculated as the number of active enterprises per thousand active 
inhabitants. The correlation coefficient for business density and regional GDP per capita is high and 
significant (r = 0.757, N = 195, p < 0.001) thus both indicators can be considered as proxies for the level 
of regional economic development.Indeed, business density turned significant in the model and shows a 
positive sign with the dependent variable.17
This provides further evidence for the argument that in Eastern Europe the richer regions tend to secure 
more EU funds than the poorer ones. Recent country studies analyzing the distribution of EU grants have 
reached similar conclusions (Bloom/Petrova 2013; Raagmaa/Kalvet/Kasesalu 2014).
However, if funds are typically absorbed by the relatively more prosperous areas while the most backward 
regions secure proportionally less resources, then EU funds may not decrease regional disparities, if they 
are able to trigger such effects at all. In other words, the territorial distribution of the funds in the Eastern 
member states may not contribute to the reduction of spatial inequalities, as it is suggested by Avdikos 
and Chardas (2016). 
All things considered, the original objectives of the Cohesion Policy are not fulfilled in the case of the Eastern 
member states. On the one hand, instead of empowering the regional administrations, the management 
17 Each model raises the issue of multi-collinearity because the indicators show moderate to strong correlation with 
each other (for the correlation matrix, please consult the Appendix). We do not consider it a problem though 
because in Model 3, which is the most important one for our purposes, GDP per capita has the highest Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF = 4.28), yet it shows a significant effect. Typically, multi-collinearity inflates the standard errors 
of the coefficients thus it may lead to Type II error, that is falsely concluding that there is no relationship between 
the explanatory and the dependent variable. In this case, our key explanatory variable, GDP per capita, remains 
significant in each of the specifications in spite of the presence of multi-collinearity. 
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and implementation of the funds have led to further centralization and the strengthening of the central 
state. On the other hand, funds seem to promote the development of the relatively more prosperous 
Eastern regions. Thus, the Cohesion Policy is unlikely to reduce regional disparities there. However, these 
outcomes are consistent with the recent shifts in the policy objectives, which were partly triggered by 
the economic and financial crisis and which place the emphasis on promoting economic growth in all the 
territories and on the efficient spending of the funds. Against this backdrop, the EU funds in the Eastern 
member states seem to satisfy the new orientation of the policy but this comes at a high price: the original 
objectives laid down in the Treaties have been sacrificed. Thus, the EU has partially undermined its own 
policy agenda.
4. Conclusion
In this work, we sought to critically assess the impact of Foreign Direct Investment and the Cohesion 
Policy on the Eastern European EU member states. We have shown that FDI has been a key component 
of economic integration in that the majority of foreign investments to Eastern Europe came from the 
EU-15. By now, the Eastern European economies are more internationalized than the old member states. 
However, FDI has produced some negative side-effects as well. First, the dependence on foreign capital 
has increased the vulnerability of these countries to external economic shocks. Second, most investments 
have entered the complex manufacturing and the financial, wholesale, and info-communication sectors in 
which domestic firms play only a minor role. Third, FDI has been spatially divisive: foreign investors have 
consistently preferred to set up their businesses in the most developed regions, thus reinforcing existing 
territorial disparities.
Regarding the Cohesion Policy, we argued that even though it has notably contributed to the GDP of the 
Eastern member states, the funds have failed to deliver on their original policy objectives. This is because 
the EU has recently shifted the focus of the policy from territorial cohesion to promoting economic 
growth and efficiency. The Cohesion Policy is now aligned with the EU’s economic governance agenda 
and can be regarded as a financial compensation for the tightening rules on fiscal discipline. As an indirect 
consequence, the most prosperous Eastern regions have benefited more from the funds than the most 
backward ones. This implies that EU funds have reinforced rather than reduced regional disparities in 
Eastern Europe. 
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6. Appendix 
 
Figure 7: Histogram of total contracted EU funds per capita (2007-13) 
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Table 6: List of variables included in the OLS regressions (original scales) – dependent variable: total 
contracted EU funds per capita (2007-13)
MIN MAX Mean SD Source
GDP per capita – average regional 
GDP per capita (2007-11) in PPS
5,040 44,520 12,777 6,263 Eurostat
Business density – active enterprises 
per 1000 active inhabitants (2010)
12.57 254.43 72.27 36.98 Eurostat
Population – average regional 
population (2007-14)
44,254 1,927,263 477,733 285,599 Eurostat
Population density (2008) 13.8 8,499 261.3 778.9 Eurostat
Employment level – total persons 
employed as a percentage of active 
population (2008)
35.1 115.16a 61.43 12.05 Eurostat
EU funds per capita – total 
contracted funds per capita in EUR 
(2007-13)
100.52 3,463.99 1,100.55 685,1
DG Regional 
and Urban 
Policy
a In the case of Budapest, Prague, and Sofia, the value exceeds 100, which is caused by the high number of 
commuting workers who are not included in the active resident population of these regions but are counted among 
the employed.
Table 7: Correlation coefficients of the independent variables included in the OLS regressions - dependent 
variable: total contracted EU funds per capita (2007-13)
GDP per 
capita
Not conver-
gence region
Population 
density
Population Employ-
ment level
Business 
density
GDP per capita 1
Not convergence 
region
.33*** 1
Population density .64*** .29*** 1
Population .40*** .22** .59*** 1
Employment level .36*** .38*** .30*** .14 1
Business density .76*** .42*** .49*** .32*** .32*** 1
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; *p < .05
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